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CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT PLANNING AND THE
CONTROL OF OUTLYING SHOPPING CENTERS
CLIFORD L. WEAVER*
CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN**
I. REVITALIZING THE CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT
When You're Alone
And Life is Making You Lonely
You Can Always Go-Downtown
-1960's Pop Song
Contrary to the wisdom of Petula Clark's pop hit, the loneliest thing
about most American cities in recent years has been their downtowns.
In big cities, the nightly rush hour migration to the suburbs leaves the
core areas mercury-lit deserts. Central business districts of smaller
cities have begun to fray about the edges, with boarded windows and
vacancy signs marking the opening of outlying shopping malls.
Suddenly, however, cities are again the "in" thing. The Carter
administration promises to pour more money into urban neighbor-
hoods and to emphasize rehabilitation rather than new construction.'
Urban revitalization is the watchword of the planning profession.
* Attorney-Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago, Illinois, B.A.,
University of Chicago; J.D., University of Chicago.
** Attorney-Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago, Illinois, B.A.,
Kansas State Teachers College, 1970; J.D., University of Chicago, 1974.
1. President Carter's Environmental Message to Congress, May 23, 1977 [1977
Policies] 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 132 (1977).
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Conferences which only recently mulled over the implications of
Ramapo2 and Petaluma3 now feature such topics as recycling of build-
ings, tax increment financing and central business district (CBD) rede-
velopment. Trendy young professionals, disenchanted with ranch-
house suburbia, snap up the old townhouses and Victorian gingerbread
homes found in many inner-city neighborhoods.
City after city has unveiled its version of a CBD revitalization plan.
Chicago has proposed a mall for State Street.4 Pasadena has estab-
lished a redevelopment agency to work with private developers in a
huge downtown scheme including hotels, office buildings, retail busi-
nesses and restaurants.5 The National Trust for Historic Preservation
recently announced a Main Street Project in three small midwestern
towns.6 A recent survey of cities and suburbs in northern Illinois found
that no less than thirty municipalities have initiated or are contemplat-
ing major downtown renewal efforts.7
The Urban Land Institute (ULI) reports that for the first time in
twenty-five years there is clear evidence that major retailers are show-
ing a renewed interest in downtown, indicating "a basic shift in retail
strategies." 8 According to ULI, this shift has been brought about by a
slowdown in suburban population growth, environmental pressures
and overbuilding, coupled with the basic advantages of downtown
including ready access, substantial populations of daytime workers,
and, in many locations, reviving neighborhoods close to the CBD.9
State and local governments have been quick to facilitate this trend
with a variety of laws providing new tools and techniques for CBD
redevelopment. Many states have enacted tax increment financing
statutes which allow cities to issue bonds to be retired with the in-
2. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359,285 N.E.2d 291,334 N.Y.S.2d
138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
3. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.Cal. 1974),
rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). Ramapo and
Petaluma are landmark cases involving the validity of municipal ordinances severely
restricting future growth of the community. Significant articles discussing these cases
and the growth control issue are collected in 2 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH
1-210 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
4. Chicago Daily News, Sept. 12, 1977, § 1, at 55, col. 6.
5. Trimble, Regrowth in Pasadena, 36 URBAN LAND No. 1, at 4 (Jan. 1977).
6. The three towns are Hot Springs, South Dakota; Galesburg, Illinois; and Madison,
Indiana. Interview with Robert Boyd Carter, National Trust for Historic Preservation
Project Director, in Chicago (April 26, 1977).
7. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 2, 1977, § I, at 39.
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creased property tax revenues generated by the redevelopment pro-
ject. 0 Other states have passed special commercial renewal and devel-
opment acts which facilitate CBD redevelopment projects and permit
establishment of development corporations with broad powers to ac-
quire and dispose of property and to oversee downtown devel-
opment." At the local level, municipalities have adopted flexible zon-
ing controls to promote self-reinforcing mixed-use commercial and
residential projects in central areas. 12
Despite the plethora of legislation and the renewed interest in central
business districts, redevelopment efforts are plagued by one serious
problem. The regional and community retail trade that has traditionally
been the mainstay of a vital CBD is all but impossible to retain in the
face of uncontrolled development of outlying shopping centers. In
Mount Prospect, Illinois, a Chicago suburb, village officials have hired
experts to formulate a downtown improvement plan, but the long-term
prospects are bleak as the giant ninety-store Randhurst Shopping Cen-
ter, which led to the demise of the CBD in the 1960's, continues to lure
millions of dollars in retail sales from downtown. 3
In Sioux City, Iowa, the city fathers are putting the finishing touches
on a multi-million dollar CBD revitalization plan while at the same time
fighting a court battle against a would-be developer of a large regional
shopping center to be located on the periphery of the built-up area. 14
Studies by the city indicate that if the outlying center is built before the
CBD scheme is completed, the CBD will have little chance for surviv-
al.15 In a superb case study, Professor A. Dan Tarlock documented the
similar plight of Lexington, Kentucky. 16
10. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 671h, § 86 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
I1. See, e.g., id.; Iowa Urban Renewal Law, IowA CODE ANN. § 403 (West 1976).
12. For discussions of mixed-use developments, see Wilborn, Perspective on Mixed
Use Development, 32 URBAN LAND No. 9, at 3 (Oct. 1973); Chicago Daily News, April 1,
1977, at 25.
13. Chicago Daily News, April 27, 1977, at 53. In the words of one observer, the
effect of the approval of Randhurst on the downtown was like "putting a snake in a cage
with a lame mouse." Id.
14. General Growth Properties v. City of Sioux City, Equity No. 91992 (D. Iowa,
filed Feb. 12, 1975).
15. Commercial Land Use Study, Sioux City, Iowa (prepared by Iowa Appraisal &
Research Corp.) (June 23, 1975).
16. The downtown has been deteriorating steadily since the end of World War II,
and the first regional shopping center opened in 1966. During this time, a small
urban renewal program was formulated, but before it could be determined if
this initial effort would lead to a comprehensive re-vitalization of the down-
town, the Planning Commission was faced with petitions for three map amend-
ments to permit the construction of three regional shopping centers.
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The story has been repeated across the country. It is played out in
large and small cities and in the older suburbs that ring them, but its
severest impact has perhaps been felt in those small- to medium-sized,
basically free-standing cities which provide a focal point for a relative-
ly large rural or semi-rural region. The city fathers recognize that their
CBD is slowly deteriorating and that if affirmative action is not taken,
the downward trend will continue inexorably. Except where the outly-
ing shopping center battle has already been fought and lost, the CBD of
such a city is frequently not only the commercial hub in the area, but
also the government, financial and transportation center of its region.
In these cities, more than in larger cities where tourism, convention
trade or massive office use lends activity and income, regional retail
trade is what gives vitality to the CBD. Frequently, however, the
regional market will not support more than one major center. Thus,
when the city receives a proposal to establish a new outlying shopping
center, it is in reality a proposal to abandon or to fundamentally alter
the CBD. If the city approves the shopping center development,
chances of revitalizing the CBD are all but dead.
A city cannot afford to discard its CBD. 17 If the CBD is abandoned,
the city is left with a major concentration of under-utilized public
facilities and utility systems. It most assuredly faces the burden of
creating new facilities and systems to serve the new concentrations of
development that must be expected to spring up at the city's periphery.
Just as inevitably, it must look forward to the day when significant
portions of its former central business district will be given over to a
series of marginal uses. Too often cities have watched helplessly as
second-hand stores, second-rate hotels, liquor stores, and pawn and
porno shops have crept into what was once part of their retail core.
The demise of the old core is complete when this creeping blight
spreads into the residential areas surrounding the declining business
district.
Beyond obvious physical problems associated with central business
district decline, it is reasonable to expect a more intangible loss, that of
Tarlock, Not in Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan: A Case Study of Regional
Shopping Center Location Conflicts in Lexington, Kentucky, 3 URBAN L. ANN. 133, 134-
35 (1970). The court battle which arose out of efforts to control the outlying centers is
discussed at notes 60-64 and accompanying text infra.
17. Earlier commentators often disagreed with this conclusion, maintaining that "the
courts should continue to assume that the public interest is best served by encouraging
new services rather than protecting existing ones of the same type." Tarlock, supra note
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public image. Victor Gruen referred to the central business district as
the heart of a city. 18 On that analogy, the heart is essential to the
vitality of the entire organism. Health and activity in the core support
and drive the entire city. But the central business district is also the
face of many cities. To travelers, tourists, prospective residents and
potential investors, it creates the first and often the most important
impression of the entire city. To residents of the city and region, it can
be the source of civic pride or civic embarrassment. The existence of a
healthy, attractive central area can create a municipal and regional
focus and a sense of belonging to a society larger than one's own
parochial neighborhood. It provides a place where people can interact
with one another. In short, it provides a central place of concentrated
and diverse uses, and a focus and structure for the society that re-
volves around it.
In our opinion this central place function is per se important enough
to merit protection by both planners and lawyers. Even if that philo-
sophical bent is rejected, however, the danger of abandoning central
places where they already exist must be recognized. In a recent article,
Professor Brian O'Connell noted that it is impossible to apply a centrist
or decentrist model of cities in a vacuum. 9 He aptly pointed out that
you must start with what already exists. In his words, "Taking away
the southern part of Manhattan would be like taking away the highway
system from Los Angeles." ' 20 Certainly, it would be possible to do
either, but neither could be done without producing drastic changes in
the whole physical and social make-up of each of those cities.
Similarly, in many small- and medium-sized cities, the central busi-
ness district represents not only an enormous public and private invest-
ment in buildings, transportation systems and utility systems but also a
regional focal point. To abandon this investment and this existing
structuring influence would involve massive losses. To rebuild it all in
outlying areas would require an enormous desecration of both the
urban and rural environments in terms of abandonment in the central
area, in terms of land and resources consumed in the peripheral areas,
and in terms of ever-increasing pressures for private rather than public
transportation. The residential sprawl of the past three decades only
begins to suggest the problems that will result if, instead of stopping
the trend, we accelerate and compound it by taking the diverse and
18. V. GRUEN, THE HEART OF OUR CiTIEs 83-87 (1964).
19. O'Connell, Concentration: The Genius of the City: A Critique of "The Plan for
New York City," 42 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS No. 1, at 64 (Jan. 1976).
20. Id. at 66.
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mutually supportive uses typically concentrated in a reasonably ac-
cessible central business district and spreading them out across the
country side at a random assortment of locations convenient neither to
each other nor to the population they serve. 21 Maurice Alpert, a former
shopping center developer, turned CBD redeveloper, summarized the
problem:
I know how major regional shopping centers are developed and I
know something about the planning and zoning processes that
screen such centers. Among the things I know is that rather than
fitting into a logical community master plan, these centers often
dictate the community plans. . . . Planted haphazardly as they
are in America's suburbs, these centers affect every aspect of
American life. 22
We do not mean to suggest that regional shopping centers should be,
or could be, banned. What we do mean to say is that such centers,
especially when they pose a serious threat to the continued existence
of a city's central business district, constitute a land use that can have
most fundamental and shaking influences on the entire fabric of a
community's physical and social development. They should, there-
fore, be subject to more thoughtful comprehensive planning and zon-
ing controls than has been the case to date.
It should be self-evident that municipal planners and officials, when
proceeding on the basis of adequate evidence of such possibilities,
have the right, if not the responsibility, to decide that they will protect
the physical and social investment represented by their central busi-
ness district. Yet municipal officials and planners almost invariably
shy away from exercising any controls to that end.
Some may contend that politicians and planners are helpless to deal
with the problem as they are faced with either permitting the outlying
shopping center or seeing it locate in the neighboring town. That is,
without doubt, a serious problem. Part of the answer to it lies in the
trend toward regionalism discussed in the final pages of this Article.
However, we are convinced that even where politicians and planners
have the power to control shopping centers, they tend not to exercise
it. That phenomenon is certainly seen in many of the medium-sized,
free standing cities upon which we have just been focusing. In those
cases, control over essential municipal services often gives the
21. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE COST OF SPRAWL
(1974); M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 141-65, 319-
22 (1971).
22. Speech by Maurice D. Alpert, Sixth International Conference on Urban Trans-
portation, in Pittsburgh (Sept. 10, 1974).
[Vol. 14-57
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municipality more power to control outlying development than is exer-
cised. It is also seen in some larger cities. In Honolulu, Hawaii, and
Jacksonville, Florida, for example, city-county consolidation puts the
CBD and the hinterland under the same zoning authority and yet there
has been no noticeable effort to implement a rational CBD policy by
controlling outlying commercial development.
23
We think this almost universal failure to protect the CBD by limiting
outlying commercial development is due less to a lack of power than to
a municipal gut reaction that any such policy involves the city in
"controlling competition"-an un-American, if not immoral, under-
taking. 24 "And illegal besides," chimes in the developer's attorney,
supported by a case or two in which a court said that one businessman
did not have standing to challenge his competitor's zoning or that an
23. See Charter of City & County of Honolulu, Hawaii, § 1-102 (1973); FLA. CONST.
art. 8, § 6.
24. In his book, THE ZONING GAME, Richard Babcock throws light on the schizophre-
nic attitude of municipal officials and planners toward using zoning for economic
planning. One conversation Babcock had with a planner is especially illuminating: "I
asked Robert Leary, former Planning Director for Ann Arbor, Michigan (whose
municipal client was attempting to manufacture pep pills for an anemic central business
district) whether he had faced this problem."
We have [a shopping center] on the east right now-I think about 85,000 square feet
of enclosed area which is under construction; and we have another one of about
175,000 square feet under construction on the west side of the city-both are inside
the city-and a third one proposed-it's in the process of annexation, and the
development plan is on the desk-and the question of zoning is facing the council.
When it faces the council it faces us. We have been rather torn by what you might
call conflicts of interest because we have been retained by the Chamber of Com-
merce jointly with the city council for a $32,000 study of the central business
district-what's wrong, what should we do? The planning commission has recom-
mended the development of the shopping center on the east side, the one that's on
the west side, and we're in the process of studying the third, which will also be
located on the west side. Now we're getting a reaction from the downtown mer-
chants who are questioning our loyalty and our motive. Are you just mouthing
support for downtown while doing your best to tear it down as soon as possible?
And we had to get up and make ourselves heard on this subject. First of all, a
shopping center-as we have told them-is a valid part of the land use and,
irrespective of its location inside or outside the corporate limits of the city, is going
to have a very definite impact on the downtown area. We believe that shopping
centers are pretty much in the category of death and taxes-they're inevitable-and
that a properly controlled shopping center within the corporate limits of the city, is
better for the city, generally,-the community, generally-than is a shopping center
possibly not adequately controlled on the same location, let's say a quarter of a mile
from the city limits.
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 71-72 (1966)
Babcock also relates an exchange which demonstrates that even those planners who
admit they consider economic impact, are concerned:
One West Coast planner admitted: "Well, I think it is legitimate and we have made
many plans based on the premise that it is legitimate, but it's the one thing which
causes me more sleepless nights than anything else we do."
Id. at 72.
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overabundance of existing gas stations was no reason to prohibit yet
another32 Developers can exert a great deal of political pressure and as
a consequence can make life difficult for planners and politicians who
believe there is a distinction between legitimate commercial planning
and illegitimate interference with free competition. 26
In his study of the failure of Lexington's plan to control outlying
shopping centers, Professor Tarlock concludes:
[F]undamental value orientation appears to have precluded ac-
ceptance of the plan by a majority of [commission] members.
Basically, they were unable to reconcile the economic assump-
tions on which the plan was based with their own deeply engrained
values. [E.g.] [t]heir faith in the ability of the free market system
to achieve an optimum allocation .... 27
The "moral" issue can be debated as long and as fruitfully as
religion or politics. We will content ourselves on that score simply by
noting that the essence of every zoning ordinance ever adopted is to
limit and restrict the free market and that we see nothing more or less
immoral in protecting, preserving and enhancing the character, vitality
and value of a central business district than in doing the same thing for
a subdivision of detached single family dwellings. With that nod to the
basic policy issue, we turn to the central question of whether a
municipality's zoning power may legally be employed to foster CBD
redevelopment at the expense of would-be competitors desirous of
building outlying commercial facilities.
The traditional view is represented by Bassett's solemn pronounce-
ment that: "Neither can distribution of business be forced by zoning
[I]t is not a proper field for zoning.'"' Scores of zoning cases
25. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text infra.
26. An example of the type of pressure developers can exert is illustrated by a
newspaper ad recently placed by a would-be shopping center developer in Sioux City,
Iowa. The full page ad concludes:
APPEAL TO REASON
New business, new retail store names, new national tenants. . . scores of them
want to locate in Sioux City, Iowa. This is a credit to Sioux City. However, most of
these new firms follow national marketing trends and want to locate in regional
enclosed malls, shopping centers protected from the weather elements. This is the
20th Century of merchandising. It is not just a trend coming upon us. . .it is here.
Now!
Market surveys in Sioux City give overwhelming support for a new enclosed
shopping center to be built. . . but, we are sorry to report, this "support" comes
mostly from the general public . . . not those elected to represent the populace in
official voting positions of the governing body. The public deserves to have its will
reflected through the support of its elected officials.
The Sioux City Journal, Sept. 1, 1977, § A, at 28.
27. Tarlock, supra note 16, at 169.
28. E. BAss=r, ZONING 53 (1936). As noted by Tarlock, supra note 16, at 173, two
[Vol. 14:57
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can be found to support Bassett's position.29 In fact legal literature is
full of so many cases echoing the Bassett thesis that lawyers and
judges tend to generalize their significance in an unwarranted fashion.
There is an old adage about hard cases making bad law. It is also true
that bad cases make bad law. Typically, in this area broad statements
about the impropriety of using zoning to regulate competition are made
in cases where the facts certainly justify the result but just as certainly
do not justify an extension of those broad statements to other fact
situations.
What neither Bassett nor the typical zoning/competition case pro-
vides is any real analysis of the fundamental issues involved in adopt-
ing a zoning ordinance to implement a community's plans for its
commercial growth and development. It is our thesis that such an
analysis supports much broader authority to regulate commercial de-
velopment through zoning than is suggested by an unthinking applica-
tion of old "rules" to new situations.
II. ZONING TO PROTECT PRIVATE BUSINESS INTERESTS
The great majority of cases which broadly declare that zoning may
not be used to regulate competiton 30 can be distinguished and have no
proper application to the fundamental issues involved when a commu-
nity sets out to protect its CBD through commercial zoning policies.
Nearly without exception those cases involve situations in which noth-
ing more than a private right to be free of competition was asserted or
implicit. No public interest deserving of police power protection was
involved. Cases of this type may be grouped into a few broad
categories.
First, there are the standing cases. In cases in which one or more
cases are cited by Bassett for that proposition, but neither is based on a competition
rationale: Deerfield Realty Co. v. Hague, 8 N.J. Misc. 637, 151 A. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1930);
Wiegen v. Board of Standards & Appeals, 229 App. Div. 320, 173 N.E. 883, 241 N.Y.S.
456 (1930).
29. See, e.g., cases discussed at notes 30-39 and accompanying text infra.
30. See cases discussed at notes 31-39 and accompanying text infra. See e.g. City of
Miami v. Woolin, 387 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Village of
Skokie, 86 I11. App. 2d 12, 229 N.E.2d 552 (1967); Metro 500, Inc. v. City of Brooklyn
Park, 297 Minn. 294, 211 N.W.2d 358 (1973); In re Appeal of Lieb, 179 Pa. Super. Ct.
318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955).
For an excellent and prescient early article discussing some of these cases, see
Mandelker, Control of Competition as a Proper Purpose in Zoning, 14 ZONING DIGEST
No. 2, at 33 (Feb. 1962). Mandelker correctly predicted that with increasing land scarcity
and changing urban development objectives, the competition issue would become more
important.
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businessmen have challenged the zoning of a potential competitor,
most courts have held, and justifiably so, that increased business
competition alone provides no standing to challenge a zoning change. 3'
For example, Circle Lounge and Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal32 is
frequently cited as barring zoning which limits competition, but a
review of its facts demonstrates the irrelevancy of the case to the basic
issues involved in zoning to protect a CBD. Essentially, one restaurant
owner objected to a zoning change which would permit a competitor to
locate across the street. The court held that the competitive injury was
insufficient to give the restaurant owner standing to challenge the
zoning action. Similarly, in Waltham Motor Inn, Inc. v. LaCava,33
plaintiffs challenged decisions by the city council granting special
permits for construction and operation of a motel in a limited commer-
cial zoning district. The court held the plaintiffs had no standing
because their only visible interest in contesting the city's actions was
protection of their existing motels from anticipated competition. The
same principle has been recognized in the federal courts. Clinton
Community Hospital Corp. v. Southern Maryland Medical Center,34
involved an action by one hospital to enjoin construction of the de-
fendant's competing hospital which was to be located near Andrews
Air Force Base in Prince George's County. The plaintiff argued that
construction of a hospital so close to the airbase would create serious
dangers for patients and personnel of the proposed facility and for that
reason approval of the project by the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare without an environmental impact statement
was illegal. The court rejected the claim, commenting that the suit was
spurious and holding that the plaintiff hospital was not, as a com-
petitor, within the zone of interest to be protected by the National
Environmental Policy Act and thus did not have standing to sue.
A second group of zoning/competition cases involves gas station
31. E.g., Whitney Theater Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 285, 189 A.2d
396 (1963); Kreatchman v. Ramsburg, 224 Md. 209, 167 A.2d 345 (1961); Lehrer v. Board
of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 100, 58 A.2d 265 (1948); Cord Meyer Dev. Co. v. Bell Bay
Drugs, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 211, 229 N.E.2d 44 (1967); In re Appeal of Lieb, 179 Pa. Super.
Ct. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955); Board of Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152
(1958). See notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra. But see Hughes v. City of Peoria,
80 II1. App. 2d 392, 225 N.E.2d 109 (1967) (Where CBD merchants charged special
damage to their businesses and property values they were held to have standing to
challenge a proposed rezoning for a regional shopping center three to four miles distant.).
32. 324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949).
33. 326 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
34. 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974).
[Vol. 14.57
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location. 35 The important thing to note in these decisions, as in the
standing cases, is that there is seldom any evidence whatever of a
legitimate public interest in insulating existing stations from competi-
tion. A prime example is LaSalle National Bank v. Village of Skokie,36
in which the court held that proof that fifteen stations already existed
in the immediate area and that some stations in the area had been
unsuccessful or unprofitable was insufficient to support a zoning ordi-
nance prohibiting additional gas stations. However, the court pointed
out that the Village offered no evidence to rebut or contradict the
testimony of the property owner and no evidence of any change of
conditions that warranted the zoning amendment removing gasoline
stations as a permitted use. The Village did claim that the additional
gas station would have some adverse impacts on the public health,
safety and welfare, but the court found that the Village had not been
consistent in applying that theory to other uses permitted in the area.
A similar rationale was employed in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Board of
Adjustment of Newport.37 Newport denied the plaintiff's application
for a variance from an ordinance provision forbidding construction of
a filling station within 200 feet of another filling station. Mobil Oil
challenged that decision. While noting that zoning authorities usually
have wide and liberal discretion in such matters, the court struck down
the spacing limitation, pointing out that the town had introduced no
evidence regarding fire hazards, traffic problems, or depreciation of
surrounding property value. In fact, the only testimony for the city was
given by another gas station owner who felt no more gas stations were
needed in the area. The court responded that the town could not rely
on that type of economics in making its decision: "IT]he need or lack
of need of gasoline filling stations in the area is not relevant. . . . It
may be that older gas stations may benefit from the absence of a new
modern station in the area but the public interest is not served."' 38
35. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text infra. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v Board of
Adjustment, 73 N.J. Super. 313, 179 A.2d 768 (App. Div. 1962); Blumenreich Properties,
Inc. v. Waters, 14 Misc. 2d 947, 178 N.Y.S.2d 905 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Cunningham v.*
Planning Bd. & Bd. of Appeals, 157 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 4 App. Div. 2d 313, 164 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1957); Caudill v. Village of Milford, 10
Ohio Misc. 1,225 N.E.2d 301 (1967). See generally Mosher, Proximity Regulation of the
Modern Service Station, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1965); Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 168 § 11
(1961).
36. 107 I11. App. 2d 104, 246 N.E.2d 105 (1969).
37. 283 A.2d 837 (Del. Super. 1971).
38. Id. at 840. In contrast, in cases in which the municipality introduced evidence that
the public interest would be served, regulation of gas station location has been sustained.
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Perhaps the classic case cited for the rule that competition may not
be regulated by zoning is Pearce v. Village of Edina.39 It is also a
classic example of the kind of situation that has given zoning which
limits competition a bad name. At best, it represents a clumsy effort to
establish some justifiable allocation of land uses. At worst, it reflects a
bad faith effort to protect limited private interests. The property in
question was a comparatively small scrap of land completely surround-
ed by already developed regional shopping facilities, but zoned for
multiple-family use. When the Village denied the landowner's request
for commercial zoning, he sued. Under court direction to reconsider,
the Village rezoned the property, but for office use rather than com-
mercial use, and the owner sued again. There was evidence of two
reports from a planner-one original, one doctored. The first referred
extensively to zoning the property for uses that would not compete
with the existing shopping center. The second, prepared after confer-
ences with the Village attorney, deleted all references to that objec-
tive. The court pointed out that all of the alleged public health, safety
and welfare factors upon which the Village relied were, if not phoney,
at least not proven, and ordered commercial zoning of the property.
City of New Orleans v. Nancy Dukes,4 0 a recent federal case, also
deserves mention here as the kind of case that gives economic regula-
tion a bad name. A New Orleans ordinance prohibited hot dog vendors
in the Vieux Carre historic district, but contained a grandfather clause
allowing all licensed vendors who had continuously operated in the
French Quarter for eight years prior to January 1, 1972, to continue
selling. When the ordinance became effective, there were only two hot
dog vendors. The plaintiff, Nancy Dukes, had been in business for
only one year and thus did not qualify under the grandfather clause.
The other pushcart vendor, aptly named Lucky Dogs, Inc., was an
eight-year veteran and was thus regulated into a monopoly position. 41
In reversing a summary judgment for the city, the court of appeals
recognized that pushcart vendors could be strictly regulated to pre-
serve the unique charm and beauty of the Vieux Carre, a tourist mecca
essential to New Orleans' economic well-being. The court ruled, how-
E.g., Stone v. Maitland, 446 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1971); Etzel v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155
Conn. 531, 235 A.2d 647 (1967); Mobil Oil Co. v. Township of Westtown, 29 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 245, 345 A.2d 213 (1975).
39. 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659 (1962).
40. 501 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
41. 427 U.S. at 300. There is some confusion on this point as the Supreme Court
stated that Lucky Dogs had operated there for 20 years.
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ever, that there was no rational basis for the grandfather clause: "The
hypothesis that a present eight year veteran of the pushcart hot dog
market in the Vieux Carre will continue to operate in a manner more
consistent with the traditions of the Quarter than would any other
operator is without foundation.''42
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, prefacing its
decision by noting that the "Vieux Carre. . . is the heart of that city's
considerable tourist industry and an integral component of the city's
economy. The sector plays a special role in the city's life. . .. .43
Even though the Court recognized that the ordinance was "solely an
economic regulation"' which gave one vendor a monopoly position, it
sustained the regulation on the basis that the Vieux Carre's importance
to the economy of the city justified the use of the police power to
preserve and enhance it. The Court rejected the appellate court's
conclusion that the grandfather clause so lacked rationality as to con-
stitute a constitutionally impermissible denial of equal protection. The
Supreme Court surmised that perhaps newer businesses were less
likely to have built up substantial reliance interests, or conceivably that
Lucky Dogs had itself become part of the distinctive character and
charm that distinguishes the Vieux Carre. Neither of these hypotheses
found any support in the record.
Nancy Dukes must be viewed with mixed emotion by anyone who
believes that there are circumstances under which zoning can legiti-
mately be invoked in support of commercial planning. On the one hand
it is of unquestioned importance as a clear statement by the United
States Supreme Court that municipalities may invoke the police power
to protect their commercial and economic viability, even if the effect is
to give one private business a competitive advantage over another. On
the other hand, however, one could have hoped for such a pronounce-
ment in a case where the record was more supportive of the theory.
The power to regulate commercial competition through land use con-
trols is potentially dangerous and courts and municipalities should not,
in recognizing its existence, overlook its limitations. Those interested
in seeing the power sustained within its legitimate sphere should take
no great comfort from seeing it exercised, and sustained, where there
has been insufficient study and planning and no demonstrated public
need.
42. 501 F.2d at 711.
43. 427 U.S. at 299.
44. Id. at 303.
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III. CONTROL OF COMPETITION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The decisions discussed in the preceding section, and many others
like them, stand in sharp contrast to a small, but growing number of
cases where a legitimate public interest in controlling competition has
not only been asserted but supported by detailed studies and com-
prehensive planning. In these instances, courts have sustained zoning
ordinances despite their clear impact upon competition.
Forte v. Borough of Tenafly,45 involved a request to build a super-
market on a parcel that had been rezoned from a general commercial
classification to a more restricted classification. The ordinance ex-
pressly stated the rezoning was intended to limit the use of the prop-
erty to "uses which will not have an adverse effect upon the downtown
business core.' '6 The Borough's comprehensive plan, formulated fol-
lowing a consultant's study, called for preserving and strengthening
the decaying CBD as the Borough's retail shopping center and recom-
mended the prohibition of retail businesses in the rest of the Borough.
The zoning ordinance was adopted pursuant to that policy. The court
noted that on the evidence presented, "the intention to preserve,
rehabilitate and improve the central business area" 47 was the only
possible justification for the ordinance, and emphasized that there was
no evidence that Tenafly was trying to keep out supermarkets or to
benefit any particular business or businesses in the CBD. The court
held that Tenafly "has the right to [elect to preserve its central busi-
ness district], and the fact that the ordinance may give the central area
a virtual monopoly over retail business does not invalidate it.' '
In Van Sicklen v. Browne,49 the municipality refused to issue a
special permit for a service station on the ground that "further prolifer-
ation of service stations in the proposed area would be detrimental to
the balanced development envisioned by the Master Plan." 5 The court
approved the decision saying:
Although cities may not use zoning powers to regulate economic
competition. . . , it is also recognized that land use and planning
decisions cannot be made in any community without some impact
on the economy of the community. . . .[W]e perceive that plan-
ning and zoning ordinances traditionally seek to maintain property
45. 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (App. Div. 1969).
46. Id. at 349, 255 A.2d at 805.
47. Id. at 350, 255 A.2d at 806.
48. Id. at 352, 255 A.2d at 807.
49. 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971).
50. Id. at 126, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
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values, protect tax revenues, provide neighborhood social and
economic stability, attract business and industry and encourage
conditions which make a community a pleasant place to live and
work. Whether these be classified as "planning considerations"
or "economic considerations," we hold that so long as the pri-
mary purpose of the zoning ordinance is not to regulate economic
competition, but to subserve a valid objective pursuant to a city's
police powers, such ordinance is not invalid even though it might
have an indirect impact on economic competition.51
The same rationale was applied in a more recent California decision,
Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council.52 In this case the realty
company requested the city to rezone a six-acre parcel from residential
to a classification permitting neighborhood shopping centers. The city
council denied rezoning on the ground that it would frustrate the city's
policy of encouraging commercial and residential development in a
nearby area which had already been zoned to permit neighborhood
shopping centers. Recognizing this policy and noting there was agree-
ment that the area would support one but not two neighborhood cen-
ters, the appellate court viewed the issue as being where that one
shopping center should be located. Applying these facts to the princi-
ples enunciated in Van Sicklen,53 the court held that there was no
evidence that the city was permitting commercial development on one
parcel and denying it as to another for the purpose of creating a
business monopoly. "To the contrary, the council was regulating the
commercial growth of the City as it related to the needs of the residen-
tial areas for that commercial development. 5 4
Several other decisions also hold that zoning regulations can be used
to protect an established central business district. In Schloss v. Jami-
son,55 a zoning ordinance prohibited off-site advertising signs, but not
business signs, in the CBD. The plaintiff sign company challenged the
ordinance, alleging that the regulation restricted competition with TV,
radio and newspapers. The court rejected that challenge and, more
significantly, sustained the ordinance on the ground that one of its
clear purposes was to promote the establishment of a strong central
business district by prohibiting signs advertising competing outlying
shopping centers. In Chevron Oil Company v. Beaver County,56 two oil
51. Id. at 127-28, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90.
52. 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977).
53. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
54. 68 Cal. App. 3d at 478, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
55. 262 N.C. 108, 136 S.E.2d 691 (1964).
56. 22 Utah 2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 (1969).
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companies challenged a county zoning ordinance which zoned land
around two freeway intersections for grazing. The county argued that
its refusal to rezone the land for highway service was justified because
"any tourist business which would go to the isolated junction area
would be a loss to the established businesses of Beaver City" 57 and
"any earnings and profits which might be engendered by the new
establishment would tend to drain away into other towns of compara-
ble size to Beaver which lie in adjoining counties." 58 The court sus-
tained the refusal to rezone. A similar result was reached in American
Oil Company v. Board of Appeals." The court sustained the denial of a
special exception to construct a gas station upon finding that (I) the
existence of other stations satisfied the present need, and (2) the
master plan for future development of a transit system and town center
recommended limitation of strip commercial facilities.
A case involving Lexington, Kentucky's efforts to protect its central
business district is also relevant here. Fallon v. Baker,60 demonstrates
that courts will view with favor a well thought out and explicit policy
on the location and timing of suburban shopping centers, and will hold
a city to such a policy once adopted.61 In 1967, Lexington adopted a
comprehensive land use plan which had as one of its major policies the
revitalization of its deteriorating CBD and concomitant control over
the timing and location of suburban shopping centers. The plan desig-
nated certain general areas for two shopping centers outside the CBD,
one in the southeast sector to be needed in the early 1970's and the
second in the northern sector to be needed by 1980. Yet, despite the
careful planning, the result was failure.62
Ironically, the reason for failure was not disapproval by any court of
the plan to control outlying centers, but the failure of Lexington to
57. Id. at 144, 449 P.2d at 990.
58. Id.
59. 270 Md 301, 310 A.2d 796 (1973).
60. 455 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1970).
61. For a general discussion of the events leading up to this case, see Tarlock, supra
note 16; 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER §
26.11, at 505-07 (1974).
62. As one commentator observed:
[Alt first glance this situation would appear to have been a favorable one for
intelligent implementation of planning policy-a joint city-county planning and
zoning mechanism, a new state enabling law emphasizing the importance of plan-
ning, a recently adopted plan prepared by one of America's most respected plan-
ners (Ladislas Segoe), an explicit policy on the location and the timing of suburban
shopping centers, and a court whose zoning decisions have ranked among the
country's best. Yet the result was failure.
N. Williams, supra note 61, at 506 n. 93.
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follow its own policies. 63 Only a few months after the plan was ap-
proved, the planning commission granted rezoning for development of
a forty-five acre regional shopping center on a site far from the areas
designated in the comprehensive plan. At the same time, the commis-
sion denied applications for two other shopping centers which were in
general conformity with the plan. A group of neighborhood property
owners successfully challenged approval of the development, the court
emphasizing the lack of conformity with the adopted comprehensive
plan. 64 The clear implication is that the court would have been willing
to uphold a denial of the application given the fact that Lexington had
developed a well-documented and well-reasoned plan to control outly-
ing shopping centers.
IV. SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER AREAS OF LAND USE LAW
While the number of decisions directly considering regulation of
competition in furtherance of some overriding public purpose is still
limited, several analogous lines of cases lend strong support for the
right of a municipality to adopt zoning ordinances to protect an existing
central business district despite an incidental limiting effect on compet-
ition.
A number of jurisdictions have long recognized that public need, or
the lack thereof, for a particular commercial use is a valid factor to be
considered in judging the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance. In
Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Board of Appeals,65 the court held that an
ordinance provision authorizing consideration of need was not uncon-
stitutional despite its incidental effect on competition. The court furth-
er held that such provisions were not inconsistent with cases holding
that prevention of competition is not a proper purpose of zoning. A
New York court, in Shapiro v. Town of Oyster Bay,66 sustained a
municipal policy which permitted development of new shopping cen-
ters only where the nearest shopping facilities were more than a mile
from any given neighborhood. In Duddles v. City Council,67 an Oregon
court invalidated a rezoning from residential to commercial. One rea-
son given for the decision was that, while the city's master plan
63. Tarlock explains that the population projections underlying the plan were low and
thus the shopping centers were needed prior to the designated dates. Furthermore, the
plans to revitalize the CBD never got off the ground. Tarlock, supra note 16, at 142.
64. Fallon v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Ky. 1970).
65. 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758 (1973).
66. 27 Misc.2d 844, 211 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1961).
67. 21 Or. App. 310, 535 P.2d 583 (1975).
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showed a need for some commercial property in the area, the extent of
the rezoning, taken in conjunction with existing commercial zoning,
would have allowed development of a shopping center larger than that
necessary to serve the needs of the local community. 68
In another useful line of cases, courts have recognized that although
a specific objective, such as regulation of competition, may be beyond
the scope of government power when considered as the primary objec-
tive of government action, the realization of that objective as an
incidental effect of a regulation adopted primarily to achieve a proper
public purpose will not invalidate the regulation. The Forte,69 Van
Sicklen70 and Lucky Stores71 cases all address this issue in the specific
context of ordinances regulating competition. 72 Similar holdings
abound in urban renewal cases where courts have, as a matter of
course, held that incidental private benefits do not invalidate programs
designed primarily to achieve proper public purposes. 73 Likewise, the
regulation of aesthetics has frequently been sustained as an incidental
effect of a zoning ordinance even in jurisdictions where regulation of
aesthetics is not recognized as a valid primary purpose of zoning.74
One group of aesthetic zoning cases deserves separate mention.
Florida courts long ago recognized an exception to the then general
68. Id. at 320-22, 535 P.2d at 589.
Other cases recognizing that public need for a particular commercial use may be
considered include: Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167
N.E.2d 406 (1960); Hoffmann v. City of Waukegan, 51111. App. 2d 241, 201 N.E.2d 177
(1964); Rigby v. Crate, 15 App. Div. 2d 605,222 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1961); Fasano v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
69. Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346,255 A.2d 804 (App. Div. 1969).
See notes 45-48 and accompanying text supra.
70. Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971). See notes
49-51 and accompanying text supra.
71. Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758 (1973). See
note 65 and accompanying text supra.
72. In addition, see In re Appeal of Lieb, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955)
(court rejected regulation of competition as a valid primary purpose of zoning but also
stated that a zoning ordinance was not unlawful because it incidentally restricted com-
petition in pursuit of a valid public purpose).
73. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171,
339 A.2d 278 (1975); Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 325
N.E.2d 327 (1975).
74. See, e.g., La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 Ill. 2d 415, 432-33, 312
N.E.2d 625, 634 (1974); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 53,
199 N.W.2d 525, 529 (1972); Piscitelli v. Township Comm., 103 N.J. Super. 589, 597-
98, 248 A.2d 274, 278-79 (1968); Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 64-65, 168
S.E.2d 117, 120 (1969). These and numerous other cases on point are discussed at
Annot., 21 A.L.R. 3d 1222 § 5 (1968).
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rule that zoning for aesthetic considerations was invalid and held that
where, because of the importance of tourism, aesthetic considerations
are vital to the economy of a city, aesthetics becomes a proper concern
of the zoning ordinance. 75 The cases are of particular interest because
they recognize that zoning regulations may be adopted to protect the
economic well-being of a community even where the regulation neces-
sary to achieve that protection has an incidental effect going beyond
the purposes for which zoning ordinances may normally be adopted.
The same principle has been recognized in California and New
Jersey.77
In a somewhat related line of cases, courts have sometimes sus-
tained an otherwise unacceptable regulation on the basis that preserva-
tion of a landmark or historic district was vital to the economy of a
city. For example, in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,78 an historic
district ordinance was upheld because it benefited the economy of
Nantucket by helping to develop and maintain its vacation and travel
industry. In City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. ,79 strict controls
over construction or alteration of buildings in Santa Fe's historic
district were approved because of the district's importance to the
tourism industry of the area.
Beyond these lines of cases, which represent well-established princi-
ples of direct applicability to the commercial competition question,
there are a number of significant recent trends in land use law which
suggest that courts will be increasingly receptive to regulations which
control competition in the public interest. The most important cases in
this category are those placing growing emphasis upon the importance
of, and even the requirement of, a comprehensive land use plan as a
predicate for the valid exercise of zoning powers. 8° Planning for the
future necessarily implies an allocation of land to specific future uses.
If the allocations are not honored, the plan loses its significance, a
75. See, e.g., Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957); City of Miami Beach
v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941); Eskind v. City of Vero Beach,
150 So. 2d 254 (Fla. App. 1962).
76. Desert Outdoor Advertising v. County of San Bernardino, 255 Cal. App. 2d 765,
63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1968).
77. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5-6, 198 A.2d 447,
449 (1964).
78. 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
79. 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964).
80. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888
(1968); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574,507 P.2d 23 (1973); Duddles v.
City Council, 21 Or. App. 310, 535 P.2d 583 (1975).
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result inconsistent with most of the recent developments in land use
law. If, on the other hand, the allocations are honored, it means that
land "needed" now, or in ten years, for one thing, for example,
industrial or residential use, cannot be used for something else, for
example, a shopping center. It also means that if the plan designates
"X" and "Y" as the optimum locations for commercial development,
a shopping center proposed for "Z" should be rejected. This reasoning
was adopted in City of Tempe v. Rasor,81 in which the court upheld the
denial of an application to rezone a portion of an industrial area for
commercial use. The court attached great weight to the fact that
Tempe had undertaken a comprehensive planning program in the face
of burgeoning growth and had adopted a policy of limiting commercial
development in designated industrial areas on the grounds that it was
"[v]ery difficult to get quality industrial development unless you have
[a] relatively monolithic land use pattern.'' 82 The cases which have
directly sustained the regulation of competition through zoning have
frequently placed similar strong emphasis on comprehensive plan-
ning.83
The recent trend in residential exclusionary zoning cases which
requires a community to accept its "fair share" of housing demand' is
also pertinent here. Like planning, fair share assumes an allocation to
present and future needs. For that reason these cases suggest that a
municipality will no longer be able to freely create an unlimited supply
or oversupply of land for commercial development beyond its foresee-
able needs. It will have not just the right, but the obligation, to allocate
land to reasonably foreseeable needs. Perhaps more important, the fair
share cases lead rather inescapably to two logical conclusions; each
municipality must provide at least its fair share, and no community
has an obligation to provide more than its fair share. There is every
reason to suspect that both municipalities and developers will soon
carry the fair share philosophy and its implications over from residen-
tial cases to commercial cases. In fact, one such case has already been
81. 24 Ariz. App. 118, 536 P.2d 239 (1975).
82. Id. at 122, 536 P.2d at 243.
83. See Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (App. Div.
1969) (see note 45 and accompanying text supra); Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App.
3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971) (see note 49 and accompanying text supra); American Oil
Co. v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. 301, 310 A.2d 796 (1973) (see note 59 and accompany-
ing text supra).
84. See, e.g., Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N. D. I11.
1971); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale
Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
[Vol. 14:57
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol14/iss1/4
CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT PLANNING
reported. In Sullivan v. Board of Supervisors, 5 the court seemed to
concede that a municipality may have an obligation to provide for its
"fair share" of commercial development. However, the court con-
cluded that the developer challenging the zoning had not offered suffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate that the municipality did not already
have its fair share of commercial development.
These "fair share" cases are closely related to the growing emphasis
on regionalism in both case and statutory law. Cases such as Mt.
Laurel,8 Chesterdale87 and Berenson8 8 are some of the recent cases
requiring consideration of regional factors in local land use decisions.
From a statutory viewpoint, a number of states, notably Florida, have
established mechanisms to ensure that regional needs will be taken into
account in local land use decision-making.8 9 The Model Land Devel-
opment Code adopted last year by the American Law Institute con-
tains many provisions which would increase the control of non-local
governments over developments of regional impact or benefit. 9° Both
Minnesota and New Jersey have adopted statutes having the effect of
sharing the tax benefits and burdens of developments of regional
impact. 9' Minnesota has also recently adopted legislation giving the
Twin Cities Metropolitan Council extensive control over regional zon-
ing and development decisions. The act gives the Council a potential
veto over new private construction of metropolitan-wide significance,
including major commercial developments. 2
The relevance of this trend toward regionalism is that to the extent
85. 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 318, 348 A.2d 464 (1975).
86. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
87. Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466
(1975).
88. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975).
89. The Environmental Land & Water Management Act, 14 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
380.012-. 10 (1974 & Supp. 1976). For a critique of the Florida experience, see R. HEALY,
LAND USE AND THE STATES 103 (1976). Provisions of the Florida Act relating to designa-
tion of areas of critical state concern were recently held unconstitutional in Cross Key
Waterways v. Askew, - So. 2d - (Dist. Ct. App. Y-362, Aug. 10, 1977). A full
discussion of similar developments in other states can be found in F. BOSSELMAN and D.
CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROLS (1974); NATIONAL RESOURCES
DEFENSE COUNCIL, LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977).
90. ALI, MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, Articles 7, 8 (1975).
91. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473 (Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (Supp.
1977).
92. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.173 (Supp. 1976).
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non-local government preempts the field of land use regulation, or
courts require local governments to pay greater heed to regional needs
and impacts, or tax laws stop encouraging the race for ratables, the
traditional forces that have limited the desire and ability of local
government to control competition through land use regulation will
become less important. Developers will no longer be able to play one
local government against another or to defeat the policies of one
government by crossing a municipal line into another jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the local race for ratables will no longer cause local
governments to zone beyond their realistic needs in the hope of catch-
ing as many commercial and industrial developments as possible with-
out regard to regional needs. As these developments continue, we can
hope that planners, zoners and courts will all begin to view the region
as a system in which land uses ought to be coordinated and com-
plementary rather than competitive to a point destructive of the gener-
al welfare of the region.
CONCLUSION
These recent developments in land use and zoning law suggest that a
good deal of the accepted wisdom about zoning and competition is of
limited use and doubtful validity as a guide for the future. Lawyers
refer with pride to "the genius of the common law system," by which
they mean its ability to deal with and resolve new issues on the basis of
decisions made in prior analogous situations. But here, as elsewhere,
the line between genius and insanity is a thin one. The legal system
would be out of touch with reality if it assumed that the fundamental
issues frequently involved in municipal debates over central business
districts and outlying shopping centers could be decided by reference
to cases in which zoning regulations provided only a thin veil for an
attempt to protect one businessman from the competition of another.
If the facts in any particular situation convince municipal officials
and planners that there is not a sufficient market to support both
existing business districts and a new shopping center, it seems the
height of folly to say that they must allow the shopping center to be
built so that free market forces can decide whether the shopping center
or the central business district will survive. We believe there is enough
genius in the common law to avoid that result if the municipal officials,
and the planners who guide them, will make the sort of commitment to
studying, planning and implementing a commercial development pro-
gram that is necessary to demonstrate that their purposes are founded
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in the public interest of the entire community and not in the parochial
concerns of a few businessmen.
Of course, some will say that all the legal theory and all the planning
in the world mean nothing if, as in many communities across the
country, the outlying center has already been built. The battle to
preserve a central business district is certainly easier if outlying growth
is controlled from the outset, but a good case can be made for regula-
tion even where an outlying center has been built and inroads upon the
central business district have already taken place. In some instances, a
CBD can meet a single shopping center face-to-face, but is gradually
overwhelmed as a second or third outlying center is permitted. In other
cases, even where the retail function of the CBD has been seriously
eroded by existing outlying centers, thoughtful commercial planning
and regulation can take advantage of a growing market to restore some
measure of economic vitality to a community's CBD. The Urban Land
Institute has predicted that renovation and expansion of existing cen-
ters may become the largest single area of shopping center devel-
opment activity within a few years. 93 The issue in many communities is
whether all regional retail growth will be absorbed by renovation and
expansion of outlying centers or whether it will, in part, be directed to
a renovated and expanded CBD. If the CBD is to have its share of that
growth, cities and city planners must find the determination and the
dollars to undertake the studies and the capital improvement programs
necessary, and then must support the public commitment to the CBD
with zoning provisions that effectively control the location and timing
of commercial development on a community-wide basis. Forming the
resolution to pursue such a program, rather than reforming the law, is
the greatest challenge to success in this field.
93. 5 LAND USE PLANNING REPORT 279 (1977).
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